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CONFINED AND SUSTAINABLE? A CRITIQUE
OF RECENT PASTORAL POLICY FOR




Recently, an increasing number of development plans and strategies for pastoral
communities have failed to ensure the sought sustainability, especially in eco-
systems characterised by ﬂuctuating environmental conditions. Many of these
strategies are centred on a policy of conﬁning, controlling and settling the
nomadic herders. This article illustrates some of the principles and pitfalls of this
approach with the case of semi-nomadic reindeer herding in Northern Norway.
It juxtaposes the management views advocated by the herders with those
expressed and implied by the recent state policies for reindeer herding. The focus
is placed on the changes in land tenure and resource access. On the one hand,
the state policy is founded on the assumptions of the tragedy-of-the-commons
theory and argues for a formalised individual tenure regime as the only arrange-
ment able to prevent/redress the alleged environmental degradation. On the other
hand, the herders argue for a complex, and at times paradoxical, tenure and
management regime, one that ensures both tenure security and ﬂexibility, an
adaptation of customary principles to the present situation. Our conclusion
supports increasing evidence from elsewhere that gaps between the policy
prescriptions and the pastoral management strategies have often resulted in nega-
tive social and environmental consequences. We argue for the need to include
the experience and expectations of the herders in the design of legitimate and
enduring co-management regimes as the only sustainable alternative.
Keywords: pastoralism, reindeer, land tenure, commons, institutions, Finnmark,
Norway, rationalisation 
Introduction 
The last decade has seen the emergence of increased movements aimed at
harnessing science and technology in the quest for a transition towards sustain-
ability. While the intentions are salutary, the premises and approaches of the
development plans and strategies for pastoral communities have, more often
than not, failed to ensure the sought sustainability. This situation has reached
a dramatic level in ecosystems characterised by ﬂuctuating environmental
conditions combined with poverty and the lack of alternative sources of
income. In many of these settings, the central administration has embraced a
policy of conﬁning, controlling and settling the nomadic herders (Adams 2001)
in an attitude often criticised as stemming from an ‘intellectual tradition of
anti-nomadism’ (Horowitz and Little 1987). 
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State intervention has often sought legitimacy in concerns about environ-
mental degradation (e.g. desertiﬁcation) and used stereotyped and ﬂawed
ecological evidence to back up its attempts to make nomads settle. State devel-
opment strategies have relied on the control of livestock numbers (through
destocking and commercial off-take) and of grazing pressure (through fencing
and padlocking), advocating changes toward sedentarisation, formal land tenure
and capitalist production (Adams 2001). Various groups of outsiders (e.g. conser-
vationists and farmers) often became stakeholders within the pastoral systems
by adhering to this discourse through either political or scientiﬁc pathways, thus
re-producing and supporting it at a larger scale (Roe 1999).
The herders, though, present the realities of mobile pastoralism in spatially
and temporally variable environments as very different from these prescrip-
tions; these realities may determine potentially conﬂicting needs for secure
resource tenure and (socially and spatially) ﬂexible patterns of resource use
(Fernández-Giménez 2002). 
The gaps between the policy prescriptions and the pastoral management
strategies have often resulted in disruption of local norms and rules of manag-
ing the resources, destitution of the communities and the degradation of
resources (Ostrom 2000). While this scenario has local variations, it has come
to represent one of the few constants in the world of nomadic pastoralism. This
situation is not only threatening to the welfare of pastoral communities as a
whole, but also to the environment these processes take place in, making the
sustainability goal seem both illusionary and hypocritical. 
The present article illustrates this conﬂict of discourses with the case of the
semi-nomadic reindeer pastoralism in the county of Finnmark, Northern
Norway.1
Reindeer Pastoralism in Finnmark
Pastoralism in Finnmark relies on semi-domesticated reindeer (Rangifer taran-
dus), a ruminant adapted to the arctic/sub-arctic environment, surviving the
long winters by feeding mainly on mat-forming lichens. The semi-nomadic
reindeer herders in the study area are a part of the Saami minority that spreads
over north-central Fennoscandia and part of the Kola Peninsula. 
The county of Finnmark is divided into three zones (Western, Middle and
Eastern) (see Figure 1). Finnmark’s climate shows two gradients: the coast is
affected by the Gulf Stream bringing warm and moist air from the south,
leading to cool summers and mild winters, while the central part of Finnmark
is an inland plateau (Finnmarksvidda), deﬁned by a continental climate, with
cold winters and hot and moist summers (Johansen and Karlsen, 1998). These
conditions are reﬂected in the migration of the reindeer herds during the year:
from the winter pastures of the inland, with little snow and lichen beds provid-
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ing food, to the summer pastures on the coast providing cool temperatures,
lush grass vegetation and shelter from insects.
At the landscape level, the range is divided into eight speciﬁc seasonal types
of pastures used by herders to meet the detailed requirements of the herds
during one year (for rutting, breeding, calf marking, grazing, slaughtering, etc.)
(Sara 2001). In this context, the topography of the range is important for
providing these speciﬁc conditions. At the macro level, a ﬂat landscape
promotes longer migrations requiring a greater energy and a longer time; at a
medium level the presence of borders between different grazing areas is impor-
tant for the working strategies and movement patterns.2 Finally, at a micro
level, high variation in altitude provides a valuable large spectrum of ecolog-
ical conditions per unit area, and thus speciﬁc conditions ﬁt for different
seasons (Riseth 2000). 
In Western Finnmark, reindeer grazing pastures are divided into summer
ranges (on the coast and islands), spring/autumn ranges (farther inland) and
winter ranges (farthest inland on the plateau). The summer ranges are admin-
istratively divided into 26 ‘private’ districts while the autumn/spring ranges are
managed as commons and represent key resources for the migration patterns
of the herds and calving grounds in the spring. The winter ranges of Western
Finnmark, also managed as commons, are the critical food resource for the
Figure 1: Finnmark’s reindeer ranges (redrawn after Aarseth 1985)
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reindeer as they allow survival through the long winters and the development
of the calves to be born the following spring. 
The patterns of resource exploitation and management of the pasture
ecosystems in Finnmark have undergone signiﬁcant changes during the last
few centuries. The use of reindeer shifted from an initial hunting exploitation
to a subsistence nomadic or semi-nomadic herding of semi-domesticated rein-
deer, and more recently to the market-oriented approach. 
With increasing herd sizes in the eighteenth century came the need for larger
grazing areas and well-deﬁned, ﬂexible territorial agreements (Beach 1981),
allowing herds to opportunistically use the most favourable ecological condi-
tions. These territorial patterns were perpetuated until recently within the
traditional herding system. This system, called johtolat,3 consists of migration
routes (johtingeaidnu) and grazing areas within a delimited zone (called
orohat: geasseorohat – summer range and dálveorohat – winter range) used
by the groups of herds belonging to one zone. In Western Finnmark, there are
three johtolat: Oar’jebealli (‘Western’), Nour’tabealli (‘Eastern’), Gow’do-
jotellit (‘Middle’) (Sara 2001) (Figure 2).
The territorial system is further particularised as individual herds, belong-
ing to each household (báiki), group and regroup during the year to form
unions (siida4) in order to meet the requirements of each season. The structure
of a siida at any given moment is thus a consequence of both ecological
requirements and the conﬁguration of social interactions. During summer,
Figure 2: Western, Middle and Eastern reindeer ranges in Western Finnmark
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when the animals graze on islands and peninsulas on the coast, the working
units should be large enough to exploit the individual landscapes. By compar-
ison, during winter, the food available is distributed in patches and the herds
have to move more without trampling the snow and ‘locking’ the pasture on
too large an area. In spring (the calving season) each siida has to provide
patches of good pastures for the does, preferably snow-free and nutritious
(Paine 1994).
The unions of herds acquired in time collective usufruct rights for pastures
in a given area. Thus, whenever the composition of one siida changed, by
adding a new herd or by losing one, its grazing rights remained connected to
the same core areas (orohat), but changed to match the size of the pasture allo-
cated with the size of the herd. This led to the overlapping of the borders of
the neighbouring siidas and a reciprocal use of resources. For example, if
during a certain year one of the siidas does not have enough animals to use
all of its rightful range, one of the neighbouring siida may use the grazing
resources surplus without the need for formal agreement. At the same time,
the migration system (johtolat) traditionally provided detailed regulations to
avoid mixing of herds and trampling of pastures (Sara 2001: 45). 
However, as a result of both technological developments and altered polit-
ical environment and power relations in the Saami lands, this managerial
system has suffered important setbacks in recent years.
Policy Rationalisation
In the early 1700s, as a result of the Inter-Nordic war, Denmark/Norway and
Sweden decided on the establishment of a border, yet they recognised that
nomadic herding across the border was essential for the existence of the Saami
people. This recognition took the form of an agreement, commonly known as
Lappekodisillen (Aarseth 1985:78). 
The closing of the border between Norway and Finland (under Russian rule)
in 1852, limited the access of the northernmost Saami from Norway to their
traditional Finnish winter grazing areas. The protests of the herders resulted in
a special law for the northernmost area, called The Reindeer Law for Finn-
mark, enacted in 1854. It delineated reindeer herding districts and separated
summer and winter areas with the goal of controlling the number of animals
pasturing in speciﬁc areas at any given time, to protect the vegetation (Aarseth
1985). 
In this context, the Common Lapp Law of 1883 came into play mainly to
protect farmers against damage caused by reindeer (Bull 1997). The law relied
on three basic principles: (a) District division: established in areas where there
was a right to herd; (b) Reporting requirements: the herder moving into a new
district (even if just seasonally) had to inform the local authority; and (c)
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Common responsibility: if a particular herder caused damage to the crops in
one area, all the herders in the respective area had to compensate for the losses
(Berg 1994).
This law moved responsibility from the practitioners to the administrative
system and to the government. The regulations concerning reindeer herding in
Finnmark became more deﬁned, and by the end of the century, reindeer herding
had come to be seen as an inferior, transitory development stage towards
sedentary farming (Bull 1997; Berg 1994).
In the context of an ideological conﬂict between farmers and herders, a new
law was passed in 1933 reinforcing the previous principles (i.e. district divi-
sion, reporting requirements and common responsibility). It gave more power
to the central administration to decide the borders between the spring, summer,
autumn and winter pastures, and the schedule of movement between them.
Moreover, it decided the number of animals a herder could own, limited the
number of reindeer in a given district and retained the power to ban herding
in certain areas upon proof of it damaging the agriculture, livestock, forestry
or fodder resources (Severinsen 1979). 
The Reindeer Management Act of 1978 is the main legislative framework
for reindeer herding in Norway today. It introduced three administrative levels:
(1) the local District Boards (Distriktstyret) (2) Regional Boards (Område-
styret), and (3) the Reindeer Herding Board at the national level
(Reindriftstyret) (Bull 1997; Jentoft 1998). The Regional Boards and the Rein-
deer Herding Board are appointed both by the Ministry of Agriculture and the
Saami Parliament, yet the herders are a minority in this apparatus reinforcing
the managerial provisions in practice. 
The main goals of the 1978 Act included: increase meat production, main-
tain the Saami culture, help the herders have a stable economic situation, and
maintain a settled presence in the northernmost areas of Norway. It also regu-
lated who was allowed to own reindeer. 
Fundamentally, the Act was aimed at reducing the numbers of herders and
herding units in the area assuming that a more equal distribution of the animals
between a smaller number of herders could provide the desired economic and
ecological sustainability. To this end, the Administration introduced the
Herding Unit as the main administrative entity for the industry (Riseth 2000)
and stipulated that all the reindeer in Norway should belong to individual
herding units. In order to be a recognised reindeer herder, one has to prove
descent from a Saami family that had herding as main livelihood.
This situation has been in effect to the present day and is often considered
an attempt at superimposing an agriculturalist management system upon the
traditional one (Paine 1994). The Saami own the herds, while their rangelands
are Crown Lands, administered for reindeer herding purposes by the Ministry
of Agriculture through the Reindeer Herding Administration (RHA) that plans
and regulates distribution of herds and the grazing time schedule. Thus, the
Andrei F. Marin
NOMADIC PEOPLES NS (2006) VOLUME 10 ISSUE 2 215
Act created a decision-making system based on economic and ecological data
but without many links to the cultural identity of the Saami pastoralists, enforc-
ing the management way of the State and accepting that the Saami can be a
part of it (Kalstad 1997; Paine 1994).
The Problem
With the introduction of snow scooters in Finnmark at the end of the 1960s,
and the policy of subsidies embraced by the Norwegian State, reindeer herding
suffered an intense mechanisation. This development, on the one hand, allowed
control over much larger herds, by using a smaller workforce and less time to
herd. On the other hand, the bigger herds needed larger pasture areas. In order
to have access to these pastures some of the bigger herd owners ignored the
traditional borders of the ranges especially for the autumn/spring and winter
ranges, stipulated in the 1978 Act as ‘common’ (Anonymous 1978). As the
provisions fail to mention what regulations are to be followed for the manage-
ment of these resources, they led to the exclusion of the customary tenure
system and, in the absence of a functional alternative regime, created de facto
a situation of open access to resources. 
In Western Finnmark, between 1800 and 1970 the stocking levels ﬂuctuated
between 40,000 and 60,000 head. The size of the herds constantly increased
during the 1980s, culminating around 1990 with at least 100,000 animals.
However, in the 1990s, the numbers of animals began to decrease, giving the
State the opportunity to link degradation of the lichen mats (documented by
satellite pictures and ﬁeld studies) to the increased reindeer population (Ims
and Kosmo 2001) and legitimising stock reductions as a solution to the degra-
dation of the lichen ranges. 
The situation has been portrayed as an archetype of the ‘tragedy of the
commons’, stating that whenever the pasture resources are commonly owned
and the animals are private property, each herder would act in order to
maximise proﬁts at the expense of all the others, thus ‘bringing ruin to all’
(Hardin 1968). This stance, adopted by the State (Reindriftforvaltningen 2002)
and reproduced by the media in dramatic tones like ‘environmental catastro-
phe’ or ‘irresponsible management’, has provided the needed legitimacy for a
stricter control of the reindeer herding industry as a whole. 
In order to achieve the desired sustainability, the State established ceilings
on the numbers of animals allowed for each summer district in Finnmark. In
addition, it implemented a system that relies on a geographical division of
today’s commons (the autumn/spring and winter ranges) between siidas, and
the distribution of exclusive usufruct rights connected to a well deﬁned group
of herders and a registered patch of land.
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Extensive evidence concerning mobile pastoralists in general (Ellis and
Swift 1988; Niamir-Fuller 1999) suggests that mobility is one of the key
elements in ensuring sustainability of pastoral systems in ﬂuctuating environ-
ments. This experience from other nomadic societies also suggests that a
formalisation and conﬁnement of the social and spatial patterns and bound-
aries is detrimental to systems that rely on ﬂexibility and opportunism for
survival. 
In Finnmark, the Saami reindeer herders rely on patterns of resource use
governed by variable productivity and access to resources as a result of
geology, topography, and ﬂuctuating climatic parameters such as snow depth
and rainfall. Moreover, semi-domestic reindeer management is an institutional
landscape governed by social relations that produce ﬂexible tenure and appro-
priation regimes. This gap between the two management visions has
established a conﬂictual and unproductive situation in the Finnmark reindeer
herding system.
The purpose of the present article is to juxtapose and interrogate the argu-
ments presented by the Administration in order to acknowledge as a viable
alternative the complex system of socio-cultural relationships that govern de
facto the present pastoral system in Finnmark. 
Social Arrangements and Their Erosion
Humanity is mediating the relation between land and animals, while the
paradigm adopted by conventional quantitative-oriented science
presupposes a social vacuum where the only relation of interest is the one
between animals and pasture. (Bjørklund 1990: 76)
Robert Paine (1994) described the Saami reindeer herders of the 1960s, as
migrating simultaneously within a social landscape as well as in a geographi-
cal one. The importance of social relations among the herders today has been
afﬁrmed on many occasions. Yet, the profound changes undergone by the
industry during the last 40 years have affected the role these relations play
within the reindeer herding system. The narratives of the herders deﬁne two
dimensions of the social landscape for reindeer herding. On the one hand they
portray the social interactions as a detailed response to the manifold variabil-
ity faced by herding; on the other hand they relate these interactions to the
limitations imposed by the administrative regulations.
Mixing of herds is a conﬂictual situation the herders try to avoid as it can
lead to the loss of an important number of animals (especially if they are
unmarked). The argument of conﬂicts (i.e. theft) is a deﬁning point of the ofﬁ-
cial ‘crisis’ narrative and the need for stronger regulation. Yet, the herders
question the legitimacy of the Administration’s use of the increase in conﬂicts
as an argument towards a formal rigid distribution of pastureland. They
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maintain that the mixing of herds can be either a conﬂict-generating situation
or perceived as a normal occurrence, depending on its circumstances. Further-
more, mixing of herds is always related to climatic conditions: 
When the pastures are bad, then there is a lot of mixing. There’s been a lot
of those lately but during the last two years pastures have been very good.
When it happens, one just has to ask for separations – we plan it usually
at least once every winter, together. We get the reindeer in the fence and
sort them out. (Herder 4)
The number of conﬂicts can be inﬂuenced by the number of reindeer on
one range at a given time, and more importantly, by their distribution in herds.
More animals lead to increased density and more interaction between herds. If
these animals are distributed in more herds, each with different interests and
strategies, more conﬂicts can arise:
We haven’t had many conﬂicts lately, and the reason is that there are not
so many animals. Had there been more animals, there would be more
mixing because the density is much higher in Inner Finnmark in winter.
That’s one of the reasons why we don’t have much mixing. [Q: Do you
think there are more conﬂicts now than in the past?] Eh … there are more
people now. We have never had so many herders in West Finnmark
before. More people … more things that can go wrong. And it’s like that
everywhere in the world: more people, more problems, both among them
and with the outside society. (Herder 1)
The number of persons involved in the industry in Western Finnmark has
constantly increased since the 1980s, together with the number of registered
units (Ims and Kosmo 2001). At ﬁrst, this increase can be interpreted as the
result of more young people joining their families, but the increased number
of units must be related to more signiﬁcant changes like the need for comply-
ing with the administrative provisions as to who is allowed to practise reindeer
herding. During the period with the most reindeer (1988–1992), the number of
ofﬁcially registered herding units increased disproportionally in relation to the
number of persons involved in herding in Finnmark (Riseth 2000). This
increase could be interpreted as both a manifestation and a cause of the frag-
mentation of the herders’ interests. Thus, having individual legal permits for
using the common ranges, the herders did not need the approval of the herding
community at large anymore and could pursue their own interests:
There are no sanctioning possibilities. It is the law that says something
quite different than the old Saami customs, so then one has to manage not
against the law, but with the law; and the law says that this is common
pasture. So we manage it like a common pasture. (…) (Herder 1)
The argued need for formalised exclusive tenure of pasturelands appears in this
context as a source of further fragmentation of interests and increased social
friction.
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The herders argue that it is normal to have some conﬂicts, as a part of
herding and a part of life in any society, and such conﬂicts are inﬂuenced by
various circumstances. As Paine explains, the differences in perception can
have unsettling consequences: for an outsider, the ‘system of an anarchic
society (without any coordinating and binding authority)’ is likely to be
puzzling, and the practice of reindeer rustling is condemned as unacceptable,
while for the herders it might be a source of sanction among themselves. In
addition, among the herders, there are winners and losers, and those that are
more prone to losing are the larger herders and even more so those who do
not have enough control over their herd. To this end, rustling is a detailed
mechanism of redistribution of resources, through an ‘informal economic
system’ (Paine 1994: 175), contributing to an adjustment of the power rela-
tions among pastoralists. 
With modernisation of the industry, the herders needed less information
about the status of their herds and of the neighbouring ones. A more individ-
ualistic behaviour emerged. At the same time, the traditional system of dividing
the ranges was being changed by the provisions of the new laws. The pastures
were termed ‘common’ and the old regime regulating their use was ignored by
the legal provisions without being replaced by another regime. This in turn led
to a situation closer to ‘open competition’, in which the rules have been
removed. This competition was increased even more by the escalating need for
cash (increased expenses connected to mechanisation, fuel, etc.) and the
increased number of herders involved. 
In this context the narratives of the herders are important. According to
them, the conﬂicts are a result of the introduction of the new legal provisions:
There is a bit of conﬂict. The number hasn’t increased, but there are going
to be conﬂicts as long as there is ‘common pasture’. As for today, it’s not
common; they just call it that … The conﬂicts started in the 1980s and
1990s, when the concept of ‘common pasture’ was introduced: since then
it was common, so anybody could graze anywhere they wanted. (Herder
2 – emphasis added) 
The extent to which the 1933 Law and the 1978 Act contributed to change
in institutional arrangements will be discussed shortly. Here, I mention only
that the law of 1978, in effect today, stipulates the following regarding the
common ranges: ‘Furthermore, the Reindeer Herding Board can undertake
division of the traditional common spring, autumn and winter ranges in Finn-
mark, where the exploitation has followed traditional patterns’ (Article 1, §2).
Nothing is mentioned, though, about the criteria on which these decisions
(division of ranges, grazing schedules, etc.) are to be based.
In the same context, the mobility of herders and animals between different
herding groups (siidas) is an important source of ﬂexibility in management.
This practice allows herders to adjust the size of a herd to the resources avail-
able in terms of pasture, workforce and knowledge at any given time. This was
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reﬂected traditionally in the frequent regrouping of siida partners (siidaguoibmi)
determining the number of siidas to ﬂuctuate between different seasons and
years (Sara 2001). At the same time the development in terms of size of herd
and competent personnel is important in inﬂuencing regrouping: a broader
choice of possible siida partners gives better opportunities in providing the best
conditions for the animals. These ﬂexible arrangements also give the opportu-
nity to improve co-operation between the partners in each siida. No kinship tie
is decisive in forming the groups: ‘father and married son have contractual rela-
tions like those between any other two partners’ (Paine 1970: 56).
Traditionally, being recognised as a reindeer herder is ‘on the one side the
outcome of long-term social negotiations and adaptive trials from the part of
the herders. On the other hand, it is the result of reindeer managing to prop-
erly settle in during a long trial period’ (Bjørklund and Brantenberg 1981: 35).
The narratives of the herders reﬂect this stance: the formation of siidas and
mobility between them is inﬂuenced by kinship but determined by other
ecological and social factors. Moreover, these relations are ﬂexible in time;
there is no set duration for their survival:
It is normal to think about it [shifting siida] especially if others have a bit
better winter pastures. It has happened: three years ago we were in
another siida, or they were in ours. It can be relevant if one gets married,
then it can be normal to move. Or if some would use the pastures
collectively and not necessarily based on kinship … This is decided by
people, there are not some decided relationships ‘forever’. (Herder 1)
This mobility is an important tool for attuning the social and economic require-
ments to the ecological opportunities and constraints: the range condition, the
territoriality of the reindeer (if the territory is shifted often, one can totally lose
control over the herd – Sara 2001: 98), etc. Thus, the balance between ﬂexi-
bility and territorial stability is traditionally carefully weighed and adjusted to
the speciﬁc needs of the household.
In recent years, this intricate system of managing the workforce and knowl-
edge has gradually been replaced by the management apparatus. First the State
decides who is allowed to practise reindeer herding. While the Act of 1933
gave the right to be a ‘full-time herder’ in Finnmark exclusively to Saami, the
Law of 1978 stipulated that only Saami who had herding as their main suste-
nance, or those descending from this kind of herder were allowed to practise
herding here (§3). So, any herder who could not prove that his/her father or
grandfather had been a full-time herder could not get access into the industry.
This proof is hampered both by the technical difﬁculty (lack of written records
or census) and by the ambiguity of the term ‘full-time herder’ (a more accu-
rate translation would be ‘which has had reindeer herding as main sustenance’,
but no other details were given as to how to decide this). 
In addition, the Reindeer Herding Act from 1978 introduced the provision
that every reindeer has to belong to a certain herding unit (driftsenhet). A
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herding unit can consist of many herders but only one of them is considered
the legal holder of the unit. According to the same Act, the establishment of
new herding units has to be approved by the Area Board (Division of Rein-
deer Herding Administration). Neither this law nor its predecessor (from 1933)
mentions any criteria for assessing an application for the establishment of a
new herding unit, the decision being left to the free interpretation of the author-
ities (Anonymous 2001: (35) 6.2.7). 
We see therefore that the decision as to who is allowed to own reindeer, the
independence of the individual herders (now related to owning a herding unit)
and how to organise themselves was to a large extent removed from the tradi-
tional system and replaced with a rigid system similar to other industries. The
new system failed to acknowledge the need for ﬂexibility in using the pastures
(it is now more difﬁcult to move across groups, at least for the majority of the
herders) according to the highly variable sets of circumstances (climatic,
social, etc.). At the same time, it limited entrance into the industry, conceding
it to be based on subjective criteria (the herders are in minority in the Regional
Boards, the body that grants access into the industry). Thus, the traditional
system of trial-and-error, that assessed the ecological impact of a new herd in
a given area over a long period, was discarded. 
Finally, the herders explain more thoroughly the customary ways of deﬁn-
ing and reinforcing territoriality on the winter ranges. According to their
discourse, the customary borders on the winter range were very well deﬁned
and known, yet ﬂexible. The herders deﬁne their traditional territory in rela-
tion to exogenous factors that reduce predictability and thus require a degree
of ﬂexibility in herding. The instability can be induced by climate (mild
weather followed by frost, strong winds) or by herding practices (herds tram-
pling and packing the snow). In this case, the borders are regarded as
permissive rather that exclusive and one can take the animals on a neighbour’s
range for a short period, without previous agreements if the action is moti-
vated by a critical situation – the more critical the circumstances, the more
ﬂuid the borders: 
If for instance I have pasture here and it’s bad – ‘locked’ with ice and the
animals don’t manage to come down to it – then I can loan a bit of pasture
from the neighbour if his siida has good pastures. And I use it until mine
is good again. This is the way it has worked for hundreds of years.
(Herder 3)
Herein is restated the importance of ﬂexibility in herding, allowing the herders
to cope with the vagaries of climate. At all times the budget of opportunities
and constraints in which decisions are taken has to be relatively stable. The
stricter the limits imposed by nature, the more permissive the limits imposed
by territoriality need to be. Furthermore, the ﬂexibility of the traditional
borders is also dictated by the balance between the number of animals and the
size of the range. Even if one feels he has lost some of his traditional ranges
Andrei F. Marin
NOMADIC PEOPLES NS (2006) VOLUME 10 ISSUE 2 221
to the neighbours, as long as he does not need it (i.e. he does not have enough
reindeer to use all of it) for the time being, the case is not a source of tension:
Yes, the customary borders are set. It was later, with the concept of
‘common pasture’ that the traditional borders were no longer important,
then it was ‘common’, there was a possibility [to ignore them]. But these
borders are set; they don’t change. I have lost access to some of my winter
range, and neighbours use it now; more than half of it. We have the least
reindeer there so I guess it’s ok [enough] for us for today, maybe a little
too small and that’s because it’s common. (Herder 2)
This system often seems ‘at odds’ with a modern form of territoriality rein-
forced throughout the western world: the nation state, formed by ‘territorially
Figure 3: Traditional borders of the winter siidas in the 1960s (after Paine, 1994)
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disjoint, mutually exclusive, functionally similar, sovereign states’ (Forrest
1998: 15). In opposition, pre-modern territoriality is deﬁned by rough divi-
sions through frontier areas where there is not one territoriality but many, with
a multitude of expressions, based on non-exclusivity, mobility and ﬂexibility
(see Figure 3).
For the Saami, this form of ﬂexible territoriality is manifested in different
aspects regarding resource use, rooted in the practice of nomadism, prior to
the emergence of reindeer herding. This is also illustrated by the overlapping
ﬁshing rights for the lakes on Finnmarksvidda (timing, species and quantities
allowed to be harvested by speciﬁc groups of Saami – Anonymous 2001: 35),
or the existence of ‘residual rights’ (Saami that now live in Sweden still had
the right to ﬁsh in the area without being considered trespassers) (Odner 1992:
91). In the same way, the pastoral siida system acts to regulate access to
pasture among groups of herders. It reserves most of the pastures for its
members (divided along a complex seasonal migration and allocated in rela-
tion to the size of individual herd), while at the same time allows access to
herds from neighbouring siidas when their pasture is insufﬁcient:
We don’t have any agreements. It is automatic; one can use others’ areas.
It can happen that one tries to keep his borders ﬁxed – it doesn’t work.
You have to accept that other herders come into your area, but that’s just
for a few days or like overnight. This is the custom. (Herder 4)
We see herein that the position of the herders runs counter to exclusive
borders advocated by the State as part of the sustainability solution. However,
since an increasing number of herders express today the need for predictability
in access to ranges, some even arguing for a formalised private tenure of the
common ranges, this situation needs to be explained.
Institutional Provisions
In many pastoral systems (Fernández-Giménez 2002) herders’ request for a
formal, exclusive tenure regime based on private property is motivated by the
corrosion of the customary system and the consequent insecurity. Extensive
literature has documented customary rules and informal institutional arrange-
ments for the management of the ranges in the north of Fennoscandia (Beach
1981; Bjørklund 1990; Paine 1970, 1994). In Finnmark these traditional rules
and norms were translated into sophisticated tenure arrangements.
First, the traditional customs rely heavily on respecting the traditional
borders and the interests of all the herders that use a common range: 
One has to respect the neighbouring [siidas] and the others. And we have
the borders that have been set up through generations – you have to have
respect for those. If you don’t, then you break the borders and this leads
to problems. (Herder 2)
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Moreover, well-deﬁned rules regarding the migration across these territor-
ial borders have been in place: one was allowed to migrate along a certain
route in a speciﬁed interval and rest one’s herd in speciﬁc points for a limited
interval. Hence the degradation of lichen by trampling, the reduction of
resource availability by ‘locking’ the pasture under hard packed snow and the
danger of mixing herds were avoided. Moreover, it was the responsibility of
the herders to avoid a harmful impact upon the ranges of another herder:
For example if you move early on the autumn ranges, you can graze along
the rivers or on lake shores so that the animals don’t take too much from
the area and those that come later on can use the lichens. This way there
are not so many conﬂicts. (Herder 3)
Failure to abide by these rules was always regarded as a conscious act and
interpreted accordingly in a complex web of social relations, leading to a chain
of strategic decisions to counteract the cause (meetings among herders, change
of migration schedules, retaliation through raiding, etc.) (Paine 1994). Herein
is reiterated the needed balance between the secure resource tenure (delineated
by borders) and the ﬂexible patterns of resource allocation. The necessary ﬂex-
ibility is translated into permeability and overlapping of borders, inclusive
usufruct rights and intricate rules tailored to various situations (e.g. the event
of ‘bad winters’ with pastures locked under ice):
For instance in 1997, we could graze in others’ areas. Nobody opposed it.
Every siida moved where they could ﬁnd pastures in the neighbouring
areas and just used it. But this only happens in the worst years, with
‘locked’ pastures. (Herder 5)
Secondly, the narratives of the herders point to the fact that the model used
by the Administration fails to encompass their life modes and their paradoxi-
cal tenure system that requires both security and ﬂexibility. The body of rules
and regulations that has assured the security in using the reindeer ranges in
Finnmark holds today little practical relevance and power as the regime
managing the ranges de facto as well as de jure ignores these customs, leading
to a situation where the pastures are ‘free’:
We try to use the customary rules, but I can’t say they work. There are no
possibilities for sanction at all [Q: What do you think decides the
management?] Today there is no management, really. This area [common
ranges] it’s like a ‘free’ area. (Herder 2)
This situation is widespread among pastoral systems, often explained as a
consequence of communal lands passing under the property of the State:
The institutional arrangements that local users had devised to limit entry
and use lost their legal standing, but the national governments lacked
monetary resources and personnel to monitor the use of these resources
effectively. Thus, resources that had been under a de facto common
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property regime enforced by local users, were converted to a de jure
government-property regime, but reverted to a de facto open-access
regime. When resources that were previously controlled by local
participants have been nationalised, state control has usually proved to be
less effective and efﬁcient than control by those directly affected, if not
disastrous in its consequences. (Ostrom 2000)
In Norway, even if the State limited entry into the livelihood to the Saami,
it removed both the decision of who from among the Saami was allowed to
join and of how the ranges were to be used. Herein lies the explanation for the
ubiquitous statement that the ranges are not common (‘they just call it
common, but it’s not’), but rather ‘free’. Here anybody ‘can pasture wherever
they want’, and this situation is unmistakably connected by the herders to the
introduction of the ‘common range’ concept, alien to them. 
In the traditional system the physical boundaries of each siida’s seasonal
range were clearly deﬁned, inherited and perpetuated through tradition. The
borders did not ﬂuctuate de jure, they allowed temporary, circumstantial access
to a well-deﬁned group of users (the neighbours) according to climatic vari-
ability. The rights to use any given range derived from being a part of the siida
(the group), access into the group was decided by the herders alone upon a
detailed evaluation, in a prolonged trial-and-error fashion. The allocation of
resources was constantly reassessed in order to ﬁt the requirements of the
group as a whole (one siida could not keep the traditional range unused). The
monitoring of the use of the ranges was constantly done and interpreted among
herders, with a detailed way of construing the actions (the meaning of tres-
passing, its circumstances, its perpetrators, etc.). The sanctions ranged from
ridicule in public gatherings to full-force retaliation through rustling (Paine
1970). The legitimacy of the system was conferred by its internal representa-
tion and the fact that it was customary and gradual: all the herders knew the
borders and could appreciate if a trespasser was forced to use somebody else’s
range by circumstance, or was just making a power statement.
As the actors repeat ‘the game’ (i.e. the decisions taken are also pieces of
information that shape the perceptions the herders have about each other and,
in consequence, their future actions), the margins of error tend to diminish.
Thus, a herder who was regarded as an illegal trespasser in a speciﬁc circum-
stance could redeem herself by acting differently in a similar situation. In other
words, it is the long-term strategy that shapes the reputation of a herder, the
way he behaves in repeated instances. As Paine (1970) shows, the reputation
of each herder was an important asset in establishing the networks of herding
partners.
The present regulations have evidently overruled the local decision system,
without providing a functional alternative. The borders refer only to the
seasonal ranges as a whole: between the winter and autumn/spring (while the
summer ranges are divided among groups into districts), without allocation of
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resources for groups (be it siidas, districts or herding units). The membership
is not connected to a clear distribution of the rights to use speciﬁc parts of the
range (the most recent developments in Finnmark have seen the move towards
distributing the user rights of common ranges to speciﬁc siidas, as discussed
later). Furthermore, the monitoring of the herders, costly and ineffective, is
faced with a cumbersome and quasi-legitimate sanctioning system. 
Even if some of the customs and norms that formed the rules of the older
pastoralism are still in place, they lack power and are entangled in a system
of provisions that does not recognise them; more often it undermines them. On
the one hand the present management system lacks regulating mechanisms,
legitimacy among herders and insight into the detailed problems. On the other
hand, the discourse of the State seeks legitimacy from two sources: it is the
right and the moral duty of the State to protect the lichen ranges from ecolog-
ical degradation. Secondly, as the State has to ensure the happiness and welfare
of all its citizens, it is its duty to ensure the sustainability (economic this time)
of the livelihood and of the culture of the Saami population.
The Tragedy in Finnmark
The ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin 1968) theory is another argument for
central regulation in Finnmark. The narrative underlines that individual inter-
ests of the herders (owning as many animals as possible) and the collective
interest of the group (having ‘sustainable’ resources) do not coincide, and no
internal institution has the power to ensure that they do. Consequently, the
situation will lead to the degradation of the common resource. 
Thus, efﬁcient use of the resources requires a limitation on the herd size
and a careful distribution of the pastures. However, as individual herders will
not altruistically limit the size of their herd unless all the others do, the situa-
tion will only be stabilised under an enforced optimal distribution of resources
in the best interests of both individuals and the group. 
This paradigm has received strong support and shaped policy-making
regarding pastoralism all over the world. Its thesis ﬁts perfectly with the
ideological framework of the Norwegian welfare state. Its advocacy for privati-
sation of common-pool resources as the best way of managing the resources
has been perpetuated in recent years in the paradigms of the mainstream
sustainable development approach (Adams 2001: 103). In Finnmark, it forms
the crux of the regulation mechanism implemented by the State, not only mani-
fested in the concepts and models used but also stated explicitly in order to
justify the need for intervention: 
Such is the situation today, that large parts of pasture resources in
Finnmark are managed in principle as a common resource with open
access for a larger number of herders. This brings about a ‘game’ between
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common and individual interests, which is conﬂicting. If the ‘game’
doesn’t come under control, it will sooner or latter end up in a resource
crisis for everyone. For large areas of the common ranges in Inner
Finnmark this resource crisis is now a fact. (Reindriftforvaltningen 2002:
34 – my translation)
Recent research on reindeer herding in Finnmark argues that the Adminis-
tration played an important role in producing the tragedy (viz. the resource
degradation) in Finnmark. First, the profound changes in the society (seden-
tarisation, permanent schools for children, etc.) increased the need of mobility
for the herders: in order to spend more time with the sedentary family they
needed faster transport than that provided by reindeer. This motivated the need
for snow-scooters, four-wheel drive vehicles, etc. This increased the need for
a monetary economy, and the expenses related to herding (fuel, maintenance,
etc.) (Berg 1994). Thus, the households had to increase the size of their herds
in order to survive. Furthermore, as the traditional rules of use were abolished
by the new laws, the use of common ranges became a ‘race’ from the summer
(secure, assured) to the autumn and winter ranges, in order to secure access to
resources. Thus the scooter became indispensable for any herder, not only the
larger ones. While this claim may seem deterministic at ﬁrst, and that ‘the-
hungry-snow-scooter’ argument is only a manifestation of the change of
lifestyle in Finnmark, attuned to the transformation of the Norwegian economy
and welfare state at large, one point is warranted.
Even though the newer generation of herders might want to obtain more
from their work, the technological changes in herding have been and often are
met with scepticism. Thus, many of the herders were not eager to embrace the
changes brought about by the scooter, and perceived this as an ‘alien’ way of
herding. Consequently, they resisted (proudly) taking scooters in use: ‘I was
one of the last to start using a scooter. I used a sledge in the seventies’ (Herder
6). This pride in conforming to the ‘old ways’ is widespread, and it often inﬂu-
ences the way decisions are taken and strategies formed (Ulvevadet 2000). It
is therefore more probable that the technological changes of the industry were
not embraced light-heartedly by many of the herders, but rather as a circum-
stantial constraint.
This is the position argued by Ottar Brox (1998) regarding the use of the
tragedy of the commons paradigm: ‘Most tragedies start to develop and are
attended to when the commons are no longer accessible to the commoner, but
only to the select minority that has been able to stay in the rat race for what
remains of the free natural resources’. Thus, the present resource problems
have not come about through horizontal (population) growth but through verti-
cal growth (the transformation of exploiting units into expansive economic
actors as a result of the government policy stimulating expansion). 
Cultural and strategic differences of values in the two discourses also come
into play. Even if new subsidies might decrease the need for money, the herders
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were still inclinced to increase their herds. Large herds act as an insurance
against the ﬂuctuating environment and provide improved economy, but there
are also cultural reasons behind herd increase. Traditionally, prestige was
derived from having a ‘properly acquired’ large herd, that is, from having the
knowledge and stamina to maintain control over it (Paine 1994). 
Impressive amounts of public money being spent in order to induce owners
of small herds to leave the industry, thus providing a better economic envi-
ronment for the fewer ‘larger’ herders, created an unprecedented fracture
within the livelihood. It promoted, explicitly and implicitly, the interests of
owners of larger herds at the expense of the others, and as the larger herders
gained political momentum, they tried to inﬂuence decision making and secure
individual access rights to resources:
Yes, I think there is a connection between size of a herd and respecting
customary borders. When one has many animals, one has to keep away
from the moral, old Saami customs. One has too many reindeer to be able
to keep within one’s traditional area. So one has to use the area of
somebody else. That’s the consequence. When it’s the reindeer who must
have the best conditions, one doesn’t care about morals and customs,
when the goal is producing reindeer meat. (Herder 1)
As Brox (1998) explains, armed with the ‘tragedy of the commons’ theory,
leaders of the largest reindeer owners have argued for privatisation of pastures
and formed a coalition with strong market-liberalist forces of the Norwegian
political centre. They have managed to inﬂuence the building of reindeer
fences between the summer districts and into the commons (autumn/spring
range), thus providing a material infrastructure for privatisation. This course
of action was possible, since it was in harmony with the policy to induce as
many owners of smaller herds to leave the industry, thus leaving the bigger
herders better off: ‘if the institutional matrix rewards piracy (or more gener-
ally redistributive activities) more than productive activity then learning will
take the form of learning to be better pirates’ (North 2000).
Herein is to be found the source of discontent and resignation the herders
have in regard to the present institutions at work on the ranges of Finnmark.
As their interests are not properly represented and their rights are not enforce-
able, most of them are weak actors in managing the resources.
The narratives regarding the new laws and regulations5 converge toward a
central theme: the need for stronger rights over the ranges, for a system of
property rights that puts the traditional ways of management on the legal map.
The herders stress the need to have private rights for the territory of each siida
but resent the idea of exclusivity per se, they argue instead for excludability.
In other words, the regime should provide legal recognition for the collective
rights each siida has to their own traditional ranges but, equally important, it
should introduce a system of ‘management borders’ adjustable to the size of
the herds of each group at any given time:
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Privatisation … when you look at the siida level, the siida as legal subject
is a private unit. So the privatisation has to be based on that, but not so
that one can have very large, private areas and a number of animals that
would never match the ranges, so that one uses only 20% of range within
one’s rightful siida borders. It should be so that that one can set
management borders within the private siida borders. (Herder 1)
As a consequence, each group would have clearly recognised traditional
borders and, inside these, ﬂuid management borders that would allow neigh-
bouring siidas to use the remaining pasture on the ranges of neighbours:
Yes; I think it has to be more like private, more rights. Not so that one
keeps others away, it has to be a use (usufruct) right. I think that’s the only
way to get a better system. It has to come from the traditions, and people
have to agree on the borders that come from the traditions, not with the
use of fences. It has to be just the herders who plan it and decide together.
(Herder 4)
The proposed regime is basically an expression of the traditional herding
system and the herders’ own interpretation of the dangers of privatisation for
the interests of different groups of actors involved in managing the ranges. The
new law gives a central role to the siida and asks for the distribution of power
at a local level on the common ranges. Yet, it still maintains the old assump-
tions regarding the tragedy of the commons and the need for regulation and
the ecological model arguing for a density-dependent relation between pastures
and reindeer. On the other hand, the herders’ counter-narrative argues for the
devolution of power and the creation of a forum that can mediate between
herders, where they can solve their problems internally and which has deci-
sion-making power. 
This devolution of power, involving the herders in decision making and
using their knowledge can provide the conditions for using the resources in a
sustainable way by the herder community at large. The commons ‘should be
kept open in the sense that people in districts traditionally dependent upon
common resources must not be denied access to them’ (Brox 1998). Basically,
this is a reﬂection of the traditional system that allowed for swift and accurate
decision making in the face of continuous change, a well-informed oppor-
tunistic behaviour, trying to make the best out of the constant hazards at work
on these ranges. 
This system can still provide a great empirical foundation for designing a
sustainable use of resources, with important cultural implications for the
herding community and the Saami minority at large. The task of the Admin-
istration is to recognise this potential, accept the challenge of a different
perception of sustainability and include it in designing enduring, legitimate
management regimes, with local signiﬁcance.
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Conclusion
The present article draws attention to the general situation of today’s pastoral-
ism worldwide, while referring to a speciﬁc group: the Saami reindeer herders
of Northern Norway. The situation presented here is, alas, not unique: across
latitudes, pastoralists are confronted with challenges in the form of poverty,
insecurity, marginalisation or segregation. 
In Finnmark, the herders point out their need for secure access to resources,
more than a formalised tenure system. They argue for a system that allows
ﬂexibility in using the resources according to variability and that at the same
time provides a swift and efﬁcient way of regulating access to the resource.
This system is a detailed response to the various sources of hazards that govern
the use of resources and presents the relation between reindeer and pastures
as protean, deﬁned by extreme events. It divided the seasonal ranges into well-
deﬁned and connected areas regarded as home-ranges rather than territories per
se, that is the siidas had access rights to the area, and the power to exclude
outsiders, not exclusivity nor ownership, even if the access right to the area
was inheritable. In other words, the tenants of the access rights had primacy
in using the resources, which were managed by a system of ‘use-it-or-lose-it’
(Paine 1970, 1994; Sara 2001).
As evidence is mounting to suggest that ﬂexibility and security form the
crux of sustainability of livestock production in variable environments (Ellis
and Swift 1988, Fernández-Giménez 2002, Niamir-Fuller 1999), my conclu-
sion presents the arguments of the herders as a counter-narrative to the present
managerial system.
Since perceptions and representation of the environment and of the forces
that regulate its use are translated into management strategies, they are more
than a benign reﬂection in the eye of the beholder; they affect real people, with
real lives, sometimes for generations to come. The present article argues for
the need to address the hard choices of sustainable resource utilisation from a
different perspective, one that tries to bring together the assets and expecta-
tions of both the State and the herders as equal partners in the design of a
legitimate and enduring co-management system. The past distance between
their two discourses has a dismal history. The future might escape this dreary
scenario if the counter-narratives presented above ﬁnd a way towards main-
stream scientiﬁc recognition and then policy making. Failure to do so can only
leave the State and the herding community in a no-win situation and add to
the long list of ‘white elephants’ of pastoralism worldwide.
Notes
1. The article relies on data collected during my ﬁeldwork in Finnmark in the winter of
2001–2002. Interviews were conducted in Norwegian with siida representatives from
A Critique of Recent Pastoral Policy for Reindeer Herding in Finnmark
230 NOMADIC PEOPLES NS (2006) VOLUME 10 ISSUE 2
the three regions of Western Finnmark, herein designated as Herder 1, 2, etc,. in order
to respect their privacy. The quotes presented herein represent my translation from
Norwegian into English.
2. For example, the term njarga (peninsula) is commonly used to describe a grazing area
surrounded by natural borders on three sides; this kind of landscape is considered to
have a funnel effect upon the herds.
3. System of seasonal migration formed of migration routes (johtingeaidnu) and seasonal
ranges (orohat) within a delimited area (e.g. Nuor’tabealli) (Sara, 2001).
4. Basic herding unit (the animals and their herders); hence sii’da guoibme: ‘herding
partner’ (Sara 2001).
5. The discussions were recorded in February 2002, before the new regulations that
divide the common ranges into districts were implemented in the summer of 2003.
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